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Pegram v. Herdrich: The Supreme Court Confronts
Managed Care
Timothy S. Jost, J.D."
ERISA, adopted a quarter century ago to reform private pension law,
imposed by the end of the twentieth century a seemingly insurmountable
barrier to managed care reform. The Supreme Court's decision in Pegram
v. Herdrich' blocked one path out of the ERISA morass-broader use of
breach of ERISA fiduciary obligations suits in federal court. On the other
hand, it opened another path to holding HMOs accountable in
malpractice cases in state court-and suggested that ERISA might impose
fiduciary obligations to disclose incentives on HMOs. It is therefore an
important decision.
ERISA was intended to give the federal government primary authority
for regulating employee pension and benefits plans. As the vast majority of
Americans with private health insurance (88%) obtain it through their
place of employment, ERISA effectively gives the federal government
primary responsibility for regulating private health insurance. Section
514(a) of ERISA2 provides that ERISA "supersedes" all state laws that
"relate to" employee benefits plans. Early Supreme Court decisions read
this clause very broadly as preempting state laws that had any "connection
with or reference to" a benefits plan.3 In particular, Pilot Life v. Dedeaux
read ERISA as preempting state tort law challenges to egregious coverage
denials.4 While § 514 contains a "savings clause" excluding the traditional
state function of insurance regulation from preemption,' the Supreme
Court initially read this provision very narrowly to cover only regulation of
traditional insurance functions.6 Moreover, § 514(b) (2) (B) prohibits the
states from "deeming" ERISA plans themselves to be insurers,7 which the
Court has read as precluding state regulation of self-funded plans.8 The net
effect of the Court's early interpretations of these provisions was to severely
restrict the ability of the states to regulate employee benefits plans.
ERISA, of course, neither leaves health plans entirely unregulated nor
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health plan beneficiaries without any remedy. ERISA itself imposes
fiduciary obligations on plan administrators" and minimal procedural
obligations on plans with respect to benefit determinations. 0 Section 502
of ERISA permits a plan beneficiary to bring a civil action "to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights
under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under
the terms of the plan."" ERISA further provides for equitable relief against
acts or practices that violate ERISA,12 including violations of the fiduciary
obligations imposed by ERISA."13 Again, however, the Supreme Court has
interpreted ERISA's remedial provisions very narrowly, limiting beneficiary
recoveries under § 502 actions to compensatory contractual damages, and
precluding individual damage actions for breach of fiduciary obligations.14
ERISA's remedial scheme may have made sense in the 197 0s, when a
benefit denial was effectively a dispute over whether the plan, provider, or
beneficiary would end up bearing the cost of a service already provided. In
today's managed care environment in which benefit denials are
prospective or concurrent, however, ERISA has left beneficiaries effectively
without remedy when urgently needed care is refused. Because of ERISA
preemption, the states have limited authority to fix this problem.' 5 Federal
managed care reform, however, has been blocked by intense lobbying and
the political gridlock that has seized Washington for the past decade.
Into this legal environment came Cynthia Herdrich. Herdrich sued
Carle and her physician, Pegram, a physician owner of Carle, in state court
for malpractice and for fraud. Carle, under well-established ERISA
jurisprudence, removed the case into federal court, where Herdrich's
fraud claims were dismissed as preempted by ERISA. Herdrich ultimately
recovered $35,000 in a jury verdict on the malpractice claims, but also
amended her complaint to state a claim that the defendants had breached
their ERISA fiduciary obligations.
Herdrich's claim attacked the structure of the Carle plan. Carle's
physicians were, Herdrich alleged, vested with the authority to determine
which services they would provide their beneficiaries, and rewarded with a
year-end bonus if they denied services, saving on costs.' Herdrich sued
under ERISA provisions, which make a fiduciary personally responsible to
the plan for any ill-gotten gains obtained through breach of fiduciary
obligations. 7 Under ERISA's remedial structure, Herdrich could not
benefit personally from a favorable judgment on this claim, but the Court
could award the benefit plan profits resulting from Carle's alleged breach,
enjoin the continuation of Carle's incentive structure, and award Herdrich
attorneys' fees. Though the trial court dismissed Herdrich's ERISA claim,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this judgment in a divided
I1(2001)
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judgment."8 The Seventh Circuit en banc refused a rehearing on the case,
but four judges dissented from the rehearing denial in a decision written
by Judge Easterbrook.'
When the Herdrich case reached the Supreme Court, three different,
carefully reasoned opinions had already been written in the case by
Seventh Circuit judges Coffey, Flaum, and Easterbrook. Judge Coffey's
majority Seventh Circuit opinion held that Herdrich ought to be allowed
to proceed to trial on her theory that Carle had violated its "fiduciary
obligations to act solely in the interest of the Plan participants and
beneficiaries," by creating an incentive system that "depleted plan
resources so as to benefit physicians who, coincidentally administered the
Plan, possibly to the detriment of their patients. 2 0 Coffey's opinion
included a lengthy diatribe against HMOs, curiously faulting them for
transferring the responsibility for decisions involving medical care from
physicians to insurance executives, even though Herdrich's case
challenged the decision of a treating physician as corrupt.21
Judge Flaum's Seventh Circuit dissent rejected Herdrich's fiduciary
claim, recognizing well-established ERISA law that tolerates some conflicts
of interest on the part of administrators, who must not only provide
benefits to particular beneficiaries, but must also look after the interests of
the plan as a whole. Flaum also warned against the court taking on the job
of determining permissible managed care incentive programs on a case byS22
case basis. Flaum did, however, suggest that the court should have
followed the lead of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Shea v. Esensten,
23
requiring ERISA plans to disclose their financial incentive programs to
plan sponsors and beneficiaries. 4
Easterbrook's en banc dissent went much further. It observed that the
Carle HMO, rather than the services it provided its patients, was the
benefit afforded by the ERISA plan.20 Thus the physicians who owned Carle
could not be plan fiduciaries, and, presumably, beneficiaries had no ERISA
recourse, even under § 502, against Carle for the denial of services.
Easterbook matched Coffey's anti-managed care diatribe with his own
complaints about managed care backlash.
In reversing the Seventh Circuit's decision,Justice Souter, writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court, took yet another course, which preserves the
ability of ERISA plans to manage the delivery of health care, leaves the
door open to beneficiaries who are adversely affected by such
arrangements to obtain relief, and, perhaps most importantly, protects the
institutional interests of the federal courts.
The Court first attempted to characterize Carle's status as a plan
administrator. The Court identified the ERISA plan at issue as the
3
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contractual arrangement between Carle and the plan sponsor, Herdrich's
husband's employer.26 Thus the Carle HMO itself was not an ERISA plan,
and its internal arrangements were not directly subject to ERISA
supervision. On the other hand, the Court rejected Easterbrook's position,
as it recognized that Carle could be a plan fiduciary with respect to at least
some coverage decisions-i.e. medical services themselves were ERISA
benefits, notjust access to the Carle HMO.
The Court, however, decisively rejected the position of Judge Coffey,
asserting that Congress could not have intended ERISA to outlaw HMOs.
Indeed Congress, only a year before ERISA was adopted, had enacted a law
explicitly encouraging the formation of HMOs as part of Nixon's health
care reform plan. Moreover, in perhaps the most widely noted passages of
the case, the Court explicitly accepted that "whatever the HMO, there must
be rationing and inducement to ration."" While the Court recognized that
the lower court sought only to ban excessive incentive plans, not HMOs as
a whole, the Court concluded that establishing workable standards for
determining when HMO incentive systems violated ERISA fiduciary
obligations would prove an impossible task.29 The decision, therefore,
disappointed those who saw the case as an opportunity to define the role
of trust and loyalty in the managed care setting.3'
The Court resolved the dilemma before it by creating a distinction new
to ERISA jurisprudence. Beginning with Dukes v. U.S. Healthcaref3 in the
mid-1990s, a series of lower court decisions, seeking to rectify the injustice
wrought by Pilot Life on persons injured by ERISA HMOs, had adopted a
distinction between benefit coverage (eligibility) decisions-for which
there was no remedy under state law-and medical treatment decisions-
which were subject to state malpractice suits. Acknowledging that HMO
determinations often cannot be simply characterized as purely eligibility or
treatment decisions, the Pegram Court recognized a new category of "mixed
eligibility and treatment decisions," which decided whether a particular
service would be covered, but made this determination based on medical
judgment. 2 While this category would exclude pure coverage decisions
(whether ultrasound was a covered procedure or appendicitis a covered
condition under the plan), it would sweep in the vast majority of decisions
currently made by managed care plans, including, in the Court's words,
"physicians' conclusions about when to use diagnostic tests; about seeking
consultations and making referrals to physicians and facilities other than
[the HMO's]; about proper standards of care, the experimental character
'of a proposed course of treatment, the reasonableness of a certain
treatment, and the emergency character of a medical condition."3
In the Court's opinion, these mixed decisions are not subject to
I (2001l)
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ERISA's fiduciary requirements, i.e. the HMO won the case. On the other
hand, this result was based on a belief that these decisions are already
subject to state malpractice law, which would be preempted if these
decisions were subject to ERISA's fiduciary requirements. 34 In reaching this
result the Court seems to have significantly moved the line established by
Dukes and its progeny." Though the Court's discussion of this issue is
technically dicta, the decision strongly suggests that HMOs themselves are
now liable in state court under state malpractice law for a host of decisions
previously thought to be immunized by ERISA preemption. Indeed, Pegram
quite explicitly contemplates direct state corporate negligence litigation
against HMOs themselves in states that permit such litigation. Since
mixed eligibility and treatment decisions are apparently not governed by
ERISA, it is not necessary for states to adopt legislation authorizing such
litigation under the savings clause,3 7 and even self-insured plans are subject
to suit. In sum, those who favor holding HMOs accountable for injuries
that result from denial of treatment, lost a small battle, but advanced
381significantly in a much larger war.
Those who seek accountable managed care advanced also, at least
slightly, on another front as well. While not addressing Judge Flaum's
dissent directly, the Supreme Court, in note eight, suggested that ERISA
plans may in fact have a fiduciary obligation under ERISA to "disclose
characteristics of the plan and of those who provide services to the plan, if
that information affects beneficiaries' material interests."39 Although the
value of plan incentive disclosure is contested,4" the question about
whether such disclosure is required remains open after Pegram.
The biggest winners under Pegram, however, were arguably the federal
courts. Had the Court adopted the Seventh Circuit's position in Pegram,
every ERISA HMO would have been exposed to fact-intensive, time-
consuming federal litigation contesting its incentive structure. Pegram not
only spares the federal courts this burden, but also suggests that a large
number of mixed eligibility and treatment cases, now being litigated in the
federal courts under the complete preemption doctrine, can be moved
back to the state courts as simple malpractice cases. In the end, therefore,
Pegram may not be so much about rationing health care as about rationing
the limited resources of the federal courts.
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